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GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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5 September 1974

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT Inputs to Annual DCI Report to the President

- 1. The principal focus of the GMAIC's efforts during FY 1974 was on the analyses of the new Soviet ICBMs and our current and projected ability to exploit flight tests of these systems. There has been a continued high level of test activity in Soviet tactical defense systems developments which included anti-ship and anti-submarine systems, and tactical SAMs. There has been a noticeable swing in Soviet space developments toward military applications. The level of observable missile R&D activity in China has been remarkably low.
- The activities of this Committee which are believed to have contributed directly to one or more of the DCI Objectives for the Intelligence Community for FY 1974 are:

a. Studies

- (1) Evaluated the US capability to exploit current and projected Soviet testing of their four new ICBMs. In response to a request by the D/DCI/IC, this study examined our collection processing and analyses capabilities to IOC and made qualitative judgments of confidence in our estimated missile characteristics for the 1974-1975 time frame.
- (2) Evaluated our prospects for determining the accuracy of Soviet strategic ballistic missiles. This study, performed at the request of the D/DCI/NIO for Strategic Programs, details the problem of assessing accuracies of Soviet IČBMs. Uncertainties in accuracy determinations through the remainder of this decade using the best data and analytic techniques rather than absolute accuracies were examined.
- (3) Assessed the threat posed by certain Soviet high altitude satellites against current US overhead assets. This study, in response to a USIB request which supported NRO interests, examined

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the Soviet potential to intercept data from and/or endanger our overhead assets. (This study was completed in June but not distributed by USIB until early July 1974 because of the requirement to obtain SIGINT Committee coordination.)

(4) Monitored and evaluated the actions to improve overal intelligence on Soviet anti-ship missiles on a continuing basis.

b. Collection and Processing

(1) Examined the flexibility of	25X1 25X1
(2) Discontinuance of thecollection project was recommended to the USIB. Although the operation was interrupted by the Middle East October 1973 conflict before data was acquired, operational use of the STYX during the conflict resulted in satisfying the principal requirement.	25X1
c. <u>Inputs to Estimates</u>	
NIE 11-1-73: The Soviet Space Program Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-3-72: Soviet Strategic Defenses	
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3. The existing or oncoming problems of major import are:	
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R. E. HINEMAN Chairman

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